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Cooperation lies at the foundations of human societies, yet why people cooperate remains a co-
nundrum. The issue, known as network reciprocity, of whether population structure can foster
cooperative behavior in social dilemmas has been addressed by many, but theoretical studies have
yielded contradictory results so far—as the problem is very sensitive to how players adapt their
strategy. However, recent experiments with the prisoner’s dilemma game played on different net-
works have shown that humans do not consider neighbors’ payoffs when making their decisions, and
that the network structure does not influence the final outcome. In this work we carry out an ex-
tensive analysis of different evolutionary dynamics for players’ strategies, showing that the absence
of network reciprocity is a general feature of those dynamics that do not take neighbors’ payoffs
into account. Our results, together with experimental evidence, hint at how to properly model real
people’s behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
Cooperation and defection represent the two alternative choices behind social dilemmas [1]. Cooperative individuals
contribute to the well-being of the community at their own expenses, whereas, defectors neglect doing so. Because
of that cost of contribution, cooperators get lower individual fitness and thus selection favors defectors. This situ-
ation makes the emergence of cooperation a difficult matter. Evolutionary game theory [2] represents a theoretical
framework suitable to tackle the issue of cooperation among selfish and unrelated individuals. Within this framework,
social dilemmas are formalized at the most basic level as two-person games, where each player can either choose to
cooperate (C) or to defect (D). The Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PD) [3] embodies the archetypal situation in which
mutual cooperation is the best outcome for both players, but the highest individual benefit is given by defecting.
Mathematically, this is described by a matrix of payoffs (entries correspond to the row player’s payoffs) of the form:
C D
C R S
D T P
so that mutual cooperation bears R (reward), mutual defection P (punishment), and with the mixed choice the
cooperator gets S (sucker’s payoff) and the defector T (temptation). The heart of the dilemma resides in the condition
T > R > P > S: both players prefer the opponent to cooperate, but the temptation to cheat (T > R) and the fear
of being cheated (S < P ) pull towards choosing defection: according to Darwinian selection, cooperation extinction
is then unavoidable [4]—a scenario known as the tragedy of the commons [5].
However, cooperation is widely observed in biological and social systems [6]. The evolutionary origin of such be-
havior hence remains a key unsolved puzzle across several disciplines, ranging from biology to economics. Different
mechanisms have been proposed as putative explanations of the emergence of cooperation [7], including the exis-
tence of a social or spatial structure that determines the interactions among individuals—a feature known as network
reciprocity. In a pioneering work, Nowak and May [8] showed that the behavior observed in a repeated PD was dra-
matically different on a lattice than in a well-mixed population (or, in more physical terms, in a mean-field approach):
in the first case, cooperators were able to prevail by forming clusters and preventing exploitation from defectors.
Subsequently, many researchers, particularly from theoretical physics, devoted their attention to the problem of co-
operation on complex networks, identifying many differences between structured and well-mixed populations [9] that
by no means were always in favor of cooperation [10–12]. The main conclusion of all these works is that this problem
is very sensitive to the details of the system [9, 12, 13], in particular to its evolutionary dynamics [4, 14] (i.e., the
∗ g.cimini@math.uc3m.es
2manner in which players adapt their strategy). On the experimental side, tests of the different models were lacking
[15], because the few available studies [16–20] dealt only with very small networks. Network sizes such that clusters
of cooperators could form have been considered only in recent large-scale experiments [21, 22] with humans playing
an iterated multiplayer PD, as in the theoretical models. The outcome of the experiments was that, when it comes
to human behavior, the existence of an underlying network of contacts does not have any influence on the global
outcome.
The key observation to explain the discrepancy between theory and experiments is that most of the previous
theoretical studies have been building on evolutionary dynamics based on payoff comparison [9, 14]. While these rules
are appropriate to model biological evolution (with the payoff representing fitness and thus reproductive success), they
may not apply to social or economic contexts—where individuals are aware of others’ actions but often do not know
how much they benefit from them. Also when the latter information is available, recent analysis [23] of experimental
outcomes [19–22] show that humans playing PD or Public Good games do not base their decisions on others’ payoffs.
Rather, they tend to reciprocate the cooperation that they observe, being more inclined to contribute the more their
partners do. The independence on the topology revealed in [22] can be therefore seen as a consequence of this kind
of behavior [24]. Notably, absence of network reciprocity has also been observed in theoretical studies based on Best
Response dynamics (an update rule that, as we will see, is independent on neighbors’ payoffs) [25] and in a learning-
based explanation of observed behaviors [26]. This suggests that the absence of network reciprocity in the iterated
PD may be general for any evolutionary dynamics that does not take neighbors’ payoffs into account.
In this paper we aim specifically at shedding light on this point. In order to do so, we develop and study an
agent-based model of a population of individuals, placed on the nodes of a network, who play an iterated PD game
with their neighbors (a setting equivalent to that of recent experiments [20–22]) and whose strategies are subject to an
evolutionary process. The key point in this work is that we consider a large set of evolutionary dynamics, representing
most of the alternatives that have been proposed so far to implement the strategy updating process. At the same
time, we consider a large set of population structures, covering most of the studied models of complex networks. In
this way we are able to make, on the same system, a quantitative comparison of the different evolutionary dynamics,
and check the presence of network reciprocity in the different situations. At the end we show that the absence of
network reciprocity is a general consequence of evolutionary dynamics which are not based on payoff comparison.
MODEL
As we already mentioned, we consider a population of N individuals, placed on the nodes of a network and playing
an iterated PD game with their neighbors. During each round t of the game, each player chooses to undertake a
certain action (C or D) according to her strategy profile, then plays a PD game with her k neighbors (the selected
action remains the same with all of them) and finally receives the corresponding payoff pi(t). Each player’s strategy
is modeled stochastically by the probability p(t) ∈ [0, 1] of cooperating at round t. Strategies are subject to an
evolutionary process, meaning that every τ rounds players may update their probabilities of cooperating according to
a particular rule. Note that each player starts with an initial probability of cooperating p(0) drawn from a uniform
distribution Q[p(0)] = U [0, 1]. This results in an initial fraction of cooperators c0 equal to 1/2—a value close to what
is observed in the experiments [21, 22], and otherwise representing our ignorance about the initial strategy of the
players. In any event, our results remain valid for any (reasonable) form of the distribution Q[p(0)].
We consider different parameterizations for the PD game, i.e., different intensities of the social dilemma. While
we leave R = 1 and P = 0 fixed, we take T values in the range (1, 2), and S values in the range (−1, 0] (note
that S = P = 0 corresponds to the “weak” PD). More importantly, we take into account different patterns of
interactions among the players. These include the “well-mixed” population, represented by an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random
graph with average degree m, rewired after each round of the game (which we indicate as well-mixed), as well as
static networks (all with average degree m): Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs (random), scale free random networks with
degree distribution P (k) ∼ k−3 (scale-free) and regular lattice with periodic boundary conditions—where each node
is linked to its k ≡ m nearest neighbors (lattice). Finally, we include two real instances of networks, the first given
by the e-mail interchanges between members of the Univerisity Rovira i Virgili in Tarragona (email) [27], and the
second being the giant component of the user network of the Pretty-Good-Privacy algorithm for secure information
interchange (PGP) [28]. The degree distributions of all these networks are reported in Figure 1. In simulations, we
build the artificial networks using N = 1000 and m = 10 [29], whereas, for the two real networks it is N = 1133,
m = 19.24 (email) and N = 10679, m = 4.56 (PGP).
The original and most important aspect of this study is that we consider a large variety of evolutionary dynamics
for players to update their strategies. In addition, we remark that our study is more general than most of those en-
countered in the literature—where only pure strategies (i.e., playing always C or D) are considered. In our framework
of mixed strategies, pure strategies can arise as special (limit) cases, when for a player p becomes equal to 0 or 1.
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FIG. 1. Degree distributions P (k) of the considered networks. Note that for the well-mixed case the network is dynamic but
P (k) does not change, and thus is identical to the P (k) of random static networks.
We start by exploring a set of rules of imitative nature, representing a situation in which bounded rationality or lack
of information force players to copy (imitate) others’ strategies [30]. These rules are widely employed in the literature
to model evolutionary dynamics. Here we consider the most notorious ones, in which a given player i may adopt a
new strategy by copying the probability of cooperating p from another player j, which is one of the |ki| neighbors of
i.
Proportional Imitation [31]—j is chosen at random, and the probability that i imitates j depends on the difference
between the payoffs that they obtained in the previous iteration of the game:
P
{
p
(t)
j → p
(t+1)
i
}
=
{
(pi
(t)
j − pi
(t)
i )/Φij if pi
(t)
j > pi
(t)
i
0 otherwise
with Φij = max(ki, kj)[max(R, T ) − min(P, S)] to have P{·} ∈ [0, 1]. This updating rule is known to bring (for a
large, well-mixed population) to the evolutionary equation of the replicator dynamics [30].
Fermi rule [32]—j is again chosen at random, but the imitation probability depends now on the payoff difference
according to the Fermi distribution function:
P
{
p
(t)
j → p
(t+1)
i
}
=
1
1 + exp[−β (pi
(t)
j − pi
(t)
i )]
Note that mistakes are possible under this rule: players can imitate others who are gaining less. The parameter β
regulates selection intensity, and is equivalent to the inverse of noise in the update rule.
Death-Birth rule (inspired by Moran dynamics [33])—player i imitates one of her neighbors j, or herself, with a
probability proportional to the payoffs
P
{
p
(t)
j → p
(t+1)
i
}
=
pi
(t)
j − ψ∑
k∈N∗
i
pi
(t)
k − ψ
where N ∗i is the set including i and her neighbors and ψ = maxj∈N∗i (kj)min(0, S) to have P{·} ∈ [0, 1]. As with the
Fermi rule, mistakes are allowed here.
Unconditional Imitation or “Imitate the Best” [8, 34]—under this rule each player i imitates the neighbor j with
the largest payoff, provided this payoff is larger than the player’s:
P
{
p
(t)
j → p
(t+1)
i
}
= 1 if j : pi
(t)
j = max
k∈N∗
i
pi
(t)
k
Note that while the first three rules are stochastic, Unconditional Imitation leads to a deterministic dynamics.
4Voter model [35]—i simply imitates a randomly selected neighbor j. Differently from the other imitative dynamics
presented here (in which the imitation mechanism is based on the payoffs obtained in the previous round of the
game), the Voter model is not based on payoff comparison, but rather on social pressure: players simply follow the
social context without any strategic consideration [36, 37].
We also consider two evolutionary dynamics which go beyond pure imitation and are innovative, allowing extinct
strategies to be reintroduced in the population (whereas imitative dynamics cannot do that). As we will see, neither
of these rules (nor the Voter model) make use of the information on others’ payoffs.
Best Response [38, 39]—This rule has been widely employed in economic contexts, embodying a situation in which
players are rational enough to compute the optimum strategy, i.e., the “best response” to what others did in the last
round. More formally, at the end of each round t a given player i uses x
(t)
i (the fraction of neighbors who cooperated
in t) to compute the payoffs that she would have obtained by having chosen action C or D, respectively:
E
[
pi
(t)
i (C)
]
= Rx
(t)
i + S (1− x
(t)
i ) ; E
[
pi
(t)
i (D)
]
= T x
(t)
i + P (1− x
(t)
i )
The quantity to increase is then:
E
[
pi
(t)
i
]
= p
(t)
i E
[
pi
(t)
i (C)
]
+ (1 − p
(t)
i )E
[
pi
(t)
i (D)
]
The new strategy p
(t+1)
i is picked among {p
(t)
i , p
(t)
i − δ, p
(t)
i + δ} (where δ is the “shift”) as the one that brings to
the highest E[pi
(t)
i ] (and satisfies 0 ≤ p
(t+1)
i ≤ 1). Note that we do not use exhaustive best response here (which
consists in choosing p
(t+1)
i as the value of p that maximize E[pi
(t)
i ]) as it leads immediately to the Nash equilibrium
of the PD game (pi = 0 ∀i). Best Response belongs to a family of strategy updating rules known as Belief Learning
models, in which players update beliefs about what others will do according on accumulated past actions, and then
use those beliefs to determine the optimum strategy. Best Response is a limit case that uses only last rounds actions
to determine such optimum. We chose to restrict our attention to Best Response for three main reasons. 1) it allows
for a fair comparison with the other updating rules, that only rely on last rounds information; 2) in the non-exhaustive
formulation of Best Response, history is held in the actual values of the parameter p; 3) in PD the Nash equilibrium
is full defection, hence at the end the system collapses to this state for any information used to build beliefs about
others’ actions.
Reinforcement Learning—[26, 40–42]. Under this rule, a player uses her experience to choose or avoid certain
actions based on their consequences: choices that met aspirations in the past tend to be repeated in the future,
whereas, choices that led to unsatisfactory outcomes tend to be avoided. This rule works as follows. First, after each
round t, player i calculates her stimulus s
(t)
i as
s
(t)
i =
pi
(t)
i /ki −A
(t)
i
max{|T −A
(t)
i |, |R−A
(t)
i |, |P −A
(t)
i |, |S −A
(t)
i |}
where A
(t)
i is the current aspiration level of player i, and normalization assures |s
(t)
i | ≤ 1. Second, each player updates
her strategy as:
p
(t+1)
i =
{
p
(t)
i + λs
(t)
i (1− p
(t)
i ) if s
(t)
i > 0
p
(t)
i + λs
(t)
i p
(t)
i if s
(t)
i < 0
where λ ∈ (0, 1] is the learning rate—low and high λs representing slow and fast learning, respectively (hence for
simplicity we use τ = 1 in this case). Finally, player i can adapt her aspiration level as A
(t+1)
i = (1−h)A
(t)
i +hpi
(t)
i /ki,
where h ∈ [0, 1) is the adaptation (or habituation) rate. Note that, when learning, players rely only on the information
about their own past actions and payoffs.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Here we report the results of the extensive simulation program for the model described above. In the following
discussion, we focus our attention on the particular evolutionary dynamics employed, as well as on the specific network
topology describing the interaction patterns among the players. We study the evolution of the level of cooperation c
(i.e., the fraction of cooperative players in each round of the game), as well as the stationary probability distribution of
5the individual strategies (i.e., the parameters p) among the population. We will show results relative to the case τ = 10
(i.e., we update players’ strategy every ten rounds), yet we have observed that the particular value of τ influences
the convergence time of the system to its stationary state, but does not alter its qualitatively characteristics. Also,
we will report examples for two sets of game parameters (T = 3/2, S = −1/2 and T = 3/2, S = 0) but our findings
are valid for the whole range studied—the main differences appearing between the “strong” and “weak” version of
the PD game. Finally, we will show results averaged over a low number of realizations because, as the experiments
show, the absence of network reciprocity is observed for single realizations, and hence it should be recovered from the
model in the same manner.
Imitative dynamics
Results for the different imitation-based strategy updating rules are reported in Figures 2 and 3. As plots clearly
show, the final level of cooperation in this case depends heavily on the population structure, and often the final state
is full defection (especially for the well-mixed case). The fact that these updating are imitative and not innovative
generally leads, for an individual realization of the system, to a very low number of strategies p (often just one)
surviving at the end of the evolution. However, the surviving strategies are indeed different among independent
realizations (but when p → 0, i.e., the final outcome is a fully defective state). This points out to the absence of
strategies that are evolutionarily stable.
The easiest situation to understand is perhaps given by employing the Voter model as the update rule: since there
is no mechanism here to increase the payoffs, the surviving strategy is just randomly selected among those initially
born in the population, and thus the average cooperation level is determined by Q[p(0)] (the probability distribution
of the initial parameters p). This happens irrespectively of the particular values of T and S and, more importantly,
of the specific topology of the underlying social network. A similar situation is observed with the Fermi rule for low
β (high noise). Indeed, in this case errors are frequent, so that players copy the strategies of others at random and
c remains close on average to its initial value c0. The opposite limit of high β (small noise, the case reported in the
plots) corresponds instead to errors occurring rarely, meaning that players always copy the strategy of others who
have higher payoffs. In the majority of cases, for the strong PD this leads to a fully defective final outcome. The
exception is given by games played on network topologies with broad degree distribution, where cooperation may
thrive at a local scale (resulting in a small, non-zero value of c) because of the presence of hubs—see below for a more
detailed discussion of this phenomenon. On the other hand, the weak PD showcases more diverse final outcomes:
the stationary value of c is higher than c0 for scale-free topologies, and a non-zero level of cooperation arises also
in static random graphs and lattices. Note that in general we observe that the stationary (non-zero) cooperation
levels decrease/increase for increasing/decreasing values of the temptation T , however such variations do not alter
qualitatively the picture we present here—for this reason, we only present results for T = 3/2. Moving further,
Proportional Imitation leads to final outcomes very similar to those of the Fermi Rule for high β, which makes sense
as the two rules are very similar—the only difference being the form of the updating probability (linear in the payoff
difference for Proportional Imitation, highly non-linear for the Fermi rule). The Death-Birth rule and Unconditional
Imitation also bring to similar results, and this is also due to their similarity in preferentially selecting the neighbor
with the highest payoff. For these latter two rules, cooperation emerges for games played on all kinds of static networks
(i.e., it does not only for a well-mixed population), with a stationary value of c which varies depending on the specific
network topology and on the particular entries of the payoff matrix (T and S).
While explaining in detail the effects of a particular updating rule and of a given population structure is out of the
scope of the present work, we can still gain qualitative insights on the system’s behavior from simple observations.
Here we discuss the case of networks with highly heterogeneous degree distribution, such as scale-free ones. These
topologies are characterized by the presence of players with high degree (“hubs”) that generally get higher payoff than
an average player’s as they play more instances of the game (the average payoff being greater than 0). For a dynamics
of imitative nature, hubs’ strategy remains stable: they hardly copy their less-earning neighbors, who in turn tend
to imitate the hubs. As a result, hubs’ strategy spread locally over the network, and, if such strategy profile results
in frequent cooperation, a stable subset of player inclined to cooperate can appear around these hubs—see, e.g., [43].
The same situation cannot occur in random or regular graphs, where the degree distribution is more homogeneous and
there are no hubs with systematic payoff advantage. This phenomenon becomes evident with Proportional Imitation
as the updating rule. Note that the subset of players around hubs loses stability if they can make mistakes (as with the
Fermi rule); on the other hand, such stability is enhanced when the updating rule preferentially selects players with
high payoffs (as with the Death-Birth rule and Unconditional Imitation), because hubs’ strategy spreads more easily.
The fact that in the latter two cases cooperation thrives also in lattices is instead related to the emergence of clusters
of mutually connected players who tendentially cooperate, get higher payoff than the defectors at the boundary of
the cluster exploiting them and can thus survive.
6We finally remark that, beyond all the particular features and outcomes of each imitative dynamics, the main
conclusion of this analysis is that imitation based on payoff comparison does not lead to the absence of network
reciprocity, and that the only updating rule whose behavior is not affected by the population structure is the Voter
model (which however does not depend on payoffs).
Non-imitative dynamics
The first general remark about these evolutionary rules is that they allow extinct strategies to be reintroduced in
the population; because of this, many strategy profiles survive at the end of each realization of the system (even when
the dispersion of the parameters p is small). Results for Best Response dynamics are reported in the left column of
Figure 3. We recall that this way of updating the strategies is the most “rational” among those we are considering in
this work, and is not based on comparing own payoffs with those of others. As a result, we see that for the strong PD
the system converges towards full defection for any value of the temptation and for any population structure. Indeed,
this outcome is the Nash equilibrium of PD games, that would have been obtained also by global maximization of the
individual expected payoffs. Hence the specific value of δ (i.e., the amount by which the parameters p can be shifted at
each update) only influences the time of convergence to full defection, with higher δ causing simulations to get faster
to pi = 0 ∀i. For this reason, we only show results for a particular value of δ. For the weak PD we observe instead a
semi-stationary, non-vanishing yet slightly decreasing level of cooperation—which is the consequence of actions C and
D bringing to the same payoff when facing a defector. Such cooperation level seems to depend on the network size
(bigger networks achieve higher c), rather than on the network topology. In this sense, we can claim that evolution
by Best Response features absence of network reciprocity. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the optimal
choice for a PD game does not depend on what the others do or gain, and as a consequence the social network in
which players are embedded must play no role.
The other non-imitative rule that we consider in this study is Reinforcement Learning. Results for this choice of the
dynamics are shown in Figure 4. We start with the simplest assumption of aspiration levels A remaining constant over
iterations of the game. Here the most remarkable finding is that, in contrast to all other update schemes discussed
so far, with this dynamics evolutionary stable mixed strategies do appear: the parameters p tend to concentrate
around some stationary, non-trivial values, that do not depend on the initial condition of the population, neither on
the topology of the underlying network. Concerning cooperation levels, when aspirations A are midway between the
punishment and reward payoffs (P < A < R) we observe a stationary, non vanishing c ∈ [0.3, 0.4] (which is not far
from what is observed in experiments). The specific value of c does depend on the payoff’s matrix entries T and S,
but not on the population structure. Note that the described behavior is robust with respect to the learning rate λ
[44]. We can thus assert that Reinforcement Learning represents another evolutionary dynamics which can explain
the absence of network reciprocity. This happens because, for this choice of updating rule, players do not take into
consideration others’ actions nor payoffs when adjusting their strategy, and thus the patterns of social interactions
become irrelevant. Additional evidence for the robustness of this updating scheme derives from the behavior observed
for other aspiration levels, including dynamic ones. As a general remark, the final level of cooperation reached is
higher for higher A. For instance, when R < A < T an outcome of mutual cooperation does not meet players’
aspirations, however an outcome of mutual defection is far less satisfactory and brings to a substantial increase of
p for the next round. Because of this feedback mechanisms, players’ strategies tend to concentrate around p = 1/2
(i.e., playing C or D with equal probability), which thus results in c ≃ 1/2, again irrespectively of the population
structure. Leaving aside the questionable case of aspiration levels below punishment (S < A < P ), we finally consider
adaptive aspiration levels. What we observe in this case is that players’ aspirations become stationary—with final
values falling in the range P < A¯ < R—and that no topological effects are present (as with Best Response, bigger
networks achieve slightly higher cooperation).
Summing up, we observe absence of network reciprocity for the innovative dynamics considered here, which we
recall are not based on payoff comparison. This again supports our assumption that such outcome derives from not
taking into account the payoffs of the rest of the players.
CONCLUSION
Understanding cooperation represents one of the biggest challenges of modern science. Indeed, the spreading of
cooperation is involved in all major transitions of evolution [6], and the fundamental problems of the modern world
(resource depletion, pollution, overpopulation, and climate change) are all characterized by the tensions typical of
social dilemmas. This work has been inspired by the experimental findings [21, 22] that network reciprocity is not a
mechanism to promote cooperation within humans playing PD. We aimed at identifying the evolutionary frameworks
7that are unaffected by the interaction patterns in the population, that are thus able to properly model real people
behavior. To this end, we have considered several mechanism for players to update their strategy—both of imitative
nature and innovative mechanisms, as well as rules based on payoff comparison and others based on non-economic
or social factors. We stress that this is a very relevant point, as for the first time to our knowledge we are providing
an extensive comparison of payoff-based and non-payoff based evolutionary dynamics on a wide class of networks
(representing population structures). Our research suggests that absence of network reciprocity is a general feature of
evolutionary dynamics in which players do not base their decisions on others’ well-being. Note that the evolutionary
dynamics we excluded as possible responsibles for how people behave are difficult to justify for humans and in a
social context, because they assume very limited rationality that only allows to imitate others. Indeed, analysis of
experimental outcomes [23] point out that humans playing PD do not base their decisions on others’ payoffs. We
thus believe that the present work provides a firm theoretical support for these experimental results, and allows to
conclude that many of the evolutionary dynamics, based on payoff comparison, used in theory and in simulations so
far simply do not apply to the behavior of human subjects and, therefore, their use should be avoided.
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FIG. 2. Evolution of the level of cooperation c and stationary distribution of p when the evolutionary dynamics is, from left
to right: Proportional Imitation, Fermi Rule with β = 1/2, Death-Birth rule. Top plots refer to S = −1/2, bottom plots to
S = 0. T = 3/2 in all cases. Results are averaged over 10 independent realizations.
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FIG. 3. Evolution of the level of cooperation c and stationary distribution of p when the evolutionary dynamics is, from left
to right: Unconditional Imitation, Voter model, Best Response with δ = 10−2. Top plots refer to S = −1/2, bottom plots to
S = 0. T = 3/2 in all cases. Results are averaged over 10 independent realizations.
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FIG. 4. Evolution of the level of cooperation c and stationary distribution of p when the evolutionary dynamics is Reinforcement
Learning with λ = 10−2. From left to right: A = 1/2, A = 5/4, adaptive A (A(0) = 1/2, h = 0.2). Top plots refer to S = −1/2,
bottom plots to S = 0. T = 3/2 in all cases. Results are averaged over 10 independent realizations.
